



March 2017 Newsletter

In-Focus
Project Alpha:
Current Research and Activities
Ian J. Stewart



Emerging geopolitical uncertainties and risks accentuate the significant implications of the spread of technology and increase in trade flows to the international security climate. In this context, countering illicit trade and the effective implementation of strategic trade controls is more important than ever. As such, this newsletter highlights the research and activities Project Alpha is engaged in. In addition to high-quality research on important topics such as proliferation finance, export control implementation, sanctions, and more, Project Alpha continues to be central to the implementation

of the European Union's Partner-to-Partner (P2P) export control programme for dual-use goods, details of which are available on the [EU P2P web portal](#).

In the coming period, the team will be focusing on several new topics, such as the implications of Brexit to strategic trade controls, the strategic programs of Russia, China, and India, and more which can be found on the [Project Alpha website](#).


We plan to keep you informed about our work and research more regularly over the course of the year. If you do not wish to receive these emails, please hit the unsubscribe button below. Please also consider following us on twitter @projectalpha

News Highlights
Meet the Project Alpha Staff

Since January 2017, the project Alpha team has grown with the addition of experienced research staff and practitioners. This expansion now establishes Project Alpha as a leader in research and expertise on a variety of niche areas pertinent to illicit trade, non-proliferation controls, and sanctions.

[Read more about the Project Alpha Staff](#)

In-Focus: New Alpha In-depth Analysis
STUDY OF WMD PROLIFERATION FINANCING TYPOLOGIES: INTERIM REPORT
Jonathan Brewer



Combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a key priority for the international community. One of the tools for doing this is disruption of the networks used to finance proliferation. However, detecting financing of proliferation (FoP) is difficult and requires a better understanding of the typologies.

The King's College Study of Typologies of Financing of Proliferation is collecting and analyzing information held by governments and the banking and financial sector in order to publish reports on current FoP typologies. Additional indicators identified by this report could possibly be visible to banks and financial institutions that may be unknowingly involved in processing related transactions.

This Interim Report comprises analyses of 18 case studies, based on information supplied to the Study to date, contained in reports of UN Panels on Iran and DPRK, and in documents relating to a small selection of US Department of Justice actions.

The King's College London Study will continue to collect and analyse data on [FoP](#) from governments and the private sector, and will publish a final report in July 2017.

[Study of Typologies of Financing of Proliferation Interim Report 5 Feb 2017](#)

In-Focus: New Alpha In-depth Analysis
Examining Intangible Technology Controls
Ian J. Stewart

Controlling intangible technologies is a challenge for both governments and the private sector. Project Alpha has previously worked with universities in the United Kingdom to produce guidance on this issue. However, a more thorough conceptual examination was also required. Therefore, with the kind support of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, Project Alpha undertook a study of more than ten cases of intangible technology transfer.

As a result of this examination, it is argued that a broader strategy is required to control intangible technology transfers that could aid proliferation. It is apparent that traditional export control approaches are not sufficient. As a result, new national laws and international mechanisms might be required. However, adoption of effective mechanisms may be controversial. There, there is a need for a risk-based, targeted approach, as well as international cooperation. In parallel to working to put in place a broader strategy, this paper identifies certain specific measures that can be taken in relation to export controls to strengthen controls around intangible technology transfer.

The paper has two parts. Part one applies an adapted capability acquisition model as a tool through which to examine the contribution of intangible technology to proliferation. Part two presents the main findings from having applied this model to around ten case studies, including case studies related to additive manufacture.

[Part I: Examining ITT](#)
[Part II: ITT Case Studies](#)

In-Focus: Alpha Analysis
DPRK Successful Missile Test
Ian Bolton

On 12 February 2017 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) carried out a successful ballistic missile test of a medium range ballistic missile, the Pukguksong-2. The missile reached a height of 550 kilometers before impacting in the East Sea. This is the first such provocation by the DPRK since Donald Trump became President of the US and will be a first test of the administration. The test itself according to a number of analysts is concerning. The Pukguksong-2 shares significant similarities with the KN-11 (Pukguksong-1), a submarine based solid fuel ballistic missile. This represents a new capacity for the DPRK and one that is potentially more robust and manoeuvrable. The use of a cold-launch canister system being carried on a tracked transporter-erector launcher vehicle provides substantially greater cross-country mobility than many other North Korean ballistic missiles. Being solid fuel also means this ballistic missile would not require tanker trucks giving it a smaller foot print and making it quicker to launch. The test clearly shows the DPRK is looking to increase its ballistic missile capabilities and has the ability to do so.

[Read More](#)

In-Focus: Alpha Commentary
Putin, Trump and the JCPOA
Ian K. Bolton and Alex Dzero

The counter-proliferation world holds its breath just near two weeks on from the inauguration of Donald Trump as the 45th US President. What has been of key concern is the future of the

Iran deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). During his presidential campaign Donald Trump stated several times that if he became president he would rip up the deal which he stated was “one of the dumbest deals ever”. However, despite the raft of Executive Orders issued by President Trump so far, there has been no action on Iran so far. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains opposed to the deal and keen to see Trump deliver on his promise. However, Israel’s military, intelligence and foreign services are advocating the deal remain in place but be rigorously enforced. US allies France, Germany and the UK also back the deal. During her US visit, Theresa May has made clear that she understands Iran’s ‘malign influence’ in the world but sees the Iran Deal is vital to regional stability.

[Read More](#)

Recent Project Alpha Academic Publications

Ian Stewart and Daniel Salisbury, ‘Non-State Actors as Proliferators: Preventing their Involvement’, *Strategic Trade Review*, Autumn 2016, 2(3), available online [here](#)

Ian Stewart and Jonathan Brewer, ‘Engaging the Private Sector in Nonproliferation: Reflections from Practitioners’, *Strategic Trade Review*, Autumn 2016, 2(3), available online [here](#)

Glenn Anderson, ‘Points of Deception: Exploring How Proliferators Evade Controls to Obtain Dual Use Goods’, *Strategic Trade Review*, Spring 2016, 2(2), available online [here](#)

Recent Project Alpha In-Depth Publications

Project Alpha, ‘Pakistan’s strategic nuclear and missile industries: A baseline study for non-proliferation efforts’, November 2016, available online [here](#)

Nick Gillard, ‘North Korea’s Proliferation and Illicit Procurement Apparatus’, May 2016, available online [here](#)

Nick Gillard, ‘Iran’s missile industry: a baseline study’, January 2016, available online [here](#)

Project Alpha

www.projectalpha.eu

Centre for Science & Security Studies | King's College London
Strand, London WC2R 2LS

